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Abstract: Large-scale redevelopment projects such as Boston’s “Big Dig” 
bestow numerous public beneªts—often without charge—to nearby 
property owners. In the case of the Big Dig, these beneªts include 
twenty-seven acres of newly created parkland, where once an elevated 
freeway stood. Beyond the immediate and obvious beneªciaries are 
nearby landowners seeking “better zoning” that might include a 
relaxation of maximum height or ºoor area ratios to enjoy the new 
view. This Article explores the often hidden impact of the nearby 
landowners’ means of accomplishing their desired result: bargaining 
with municipalities for private, derivative beneªts. The Article compares 
legislative and judicial responses to land use bargaining in California 
and Massachusetts, states with dramatically different approaches to land 
use planning. The Article concludes that bargaining in the absence of a 
guiding land use plan—the Massachusetts “model”—results in a chaotic 
land use policy and unpredictable development. 
Introduction 
 When completed in 2007, Boston’s Central Artery/Tunnel Pro-
ject (commonly referred to as the “Big Dig”) will have replaced the 
city’s elevated downtown expressway, the Central Artery, with a two-
mile, twin-decked tunnel and opened over twenty-seven acres of pre-
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viously inaccessible land to public use. The result will be to re-unite a 
city once divided—like so many other American cities—by an above-
ground highway system laid out in the 1950s. 1  While the obvious 
beneªciaries of one of the nation’s largest ever public works projects 
will be the public, tangible and quantiªable beneªts also will accrue 
to readily identiªable individuals and business entities.2
 Consider, for example, the cylindrical ofªce towers One and Two 
International Place, built on the edge of Boston’s ªnancial district in 
the late 1980s. Until the spring of 2004, these structures stood within 
forty feet of the elevated highway. The ofªces of several of Boston’s 
most prominent ªrms—at least those situated on ºoors six through 
forty-six—overlooked trafªc so dense and continuous that the Central 
Artery was labeled as “one of the most congested highways in the 
United States.”3 Occupants below ºoor six had views of rusting steel 
beams and support pylons for the elevated highway. 
 Today, however, all of these ofªce ºoors overlook what will 
shortly become a public park, greenway, botanical garden, and open 
space festooned with public art.4 The noise and visual assault of the 
elevated highway is, literally, out of mind and sight, having been “de-
pressed” ªfty to seventy feet beneath its former location.5 This seem-
ingly magical transformation from blight to beauty has granted an 
enormous public beneªt to the owners and tenants of One and Two 
International Place, as well as those of hundreds of similarly situated 
properties. 
 This type of “giving” has been the focus of several excellent arti-
cles over the past thirty years, spurred by Professor Donald Hagman’s 
work, Windfalls for Wipeouts: Land Value Capture and Compensation. 6  
More recent articles have sought to analogize “givings” with regula-
                                                                                                                      
1 See Mass. Tpk. Auth., Project Background, at http://www.masspike.com/bigdig/back-
ground/index.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2005); Mass. Tpk. Auth., Tunnels and Bridges, at 
http://www.masspike.com/bigdig/background/tunnels.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2005). 
2 See Mass. Tpk. Auth., Project Background, supra note 1. 
3 See id. 
4  See Mass. Tpk. Auth., Boulevard Creation and Streetscapes, at http://www.mass 
pike.com/bigdig/parks/boulevard.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2005); Mass. Tpk. Auth., Rose 
Kennedy Greenway, at http://www.masspike.com/bigdig/parks/greenway.html (last visited Feb. 
12, 2005). 
5 See Mass. Tpk. Auth., What Are We Digging?, at http://www.masspike.com/bigdig/ 
background/digging.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2005). 
6 Windfalls for Wipeouts: Land Value Capture and Compensation (Donald G. 
Hagman & Dean J. Misczynski eds., 1978). 
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tory takings.7 The argument made by givings advocates is that if a 
court can order compensation due when it concludes that a regula-
tory taking has occurred, the same fact pattern—only in reverse— 
should support an order requiring the beneªciary of a “giving” to pay 
the government for the beneªts bestowed upon it. Simply put, givings 
theory argues that instead of government compensating the land-
owner for that which was taken, the landowner should pay the gov-
ernment for that which was given. 
 While requiring individual beneªciaries of projects such as the 
Big Dig to pay for the beneªts directly bestowed has some appeal be-
cause the reciprocity of advantage is complete, 8  we recommend 
against adoption of this theory. Our principal concern, and that ex-
pressed by others before us, is that givings awards likely would lead to 
increased approvals of regulatory takings claims; such an outcome 
could easily upset the delicate balance currently preserved by the ab-
sence of anything beyond basic ad hoc factual inquiries for each and 
every takings claim.9
 And while we decline to advocate for the adoption of formalized 
givings jurisprudence for projects such as the Big Dig, we believe a 
derivative issue is of concern: the temptation to bargain away local 
land use controls in proximity to the newly created public beneªt. 
 The bargaining away is tantamount to a giving, but more subtle 
and more destructive to the basic tenets of land use planning. 10  
Whereas an overt giving such as the creation of twenty-seven acres of 
                                                                                                                      
7 See Andrew W. Schwartz, Reciprocity of Advantage: The Antidote to the Antidemocratic Trend 
in Regulatory Takings, 22 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 1, 1 (2004); see also Daniel D. Barn-
hizer, Givings Recapture: Funding Public Acquisition of Private Property Interests on the Coasts, 27 
Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 295, 300–05 (2003). 
8 “The conclusion seems to rest upon the assumption that in order to justify such ex-
ercise of the police power there must be ‘an average reciprocity of advantage’ as between 
the owner of the property restricted and the rest of the community . . . .” Pa. Coal Co. v. 
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 422 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
9 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); Pa. Coal Co., 
260 U.S. at 413. In Penn Central, Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, reviewed the 
Court’s takings jurisprudence: 
 In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, the Court’s deci-
sions have identiªed several factors that have particular signiªcance. The 
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the ex-
tent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed 
expectations are, of course, relevant considerations. So, too, is the character 
of the governmental action. 
438 U.S. at 124 (citations omitted). 
10 See Durand v. IDC Bellingham, LLC, 793 N.E.2d 359, 369 (Mass. 2003). 
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public open space across from an ofªce building is a transparent gift, 
the beneªciaries of this gift are not limited to immediate neighbors. 
Indeed, while the owners and tenants of One and Two International 
Place clearly are beneªciaries, perhaps they are merely incidental 
beneªciaries. Perhaps instead, the residents of the city of Boston and 
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts are the true winners in measur-
ing beneªt. 
 A different conclusion results where subsequent to the “public” 
giving, incremental petitions for rezoning or other private land use 
entitlements occur within proximity to the public works project. For 
example, only time will tell how many property owners that could have 
a view of the new greenway and public parks but for a zoning change 
will now petition the City Council for zoning relief. 
 Our concern for the derivative impacts of projects such as the Big 
Dig is particularly acute in non-plan states, such as Massachusetts, 
which do not require any rational connection between planning and 
land use controls.11 For example, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court (SJC) recently approved a town’s decision to rezone land for an 
energy facility where the rezoning was contingent upon the payment 
to the town of $8 million.12 Using this logic, property owners within 
feet, blocks, or even greater distances could simply purchase more 
beneªcial zoning.13 There is every indication that property owners are 
lining up to purchase more attractive zoning in the wake of this 2003 
SJC ruling.14
 The result can be noticeably different in plan states, which re-
quire a level of consistency between a plan and resulting regulatory 
instruments such as zoning and subdivision control.15 A plan state re-
                                                                                                                      
11 See id.; McLean Hosp. Corp. v. Town of Belmont, 778 N.E.2d 1016, 1022 (Mass. App. 
Ct. 2002). 
12 Durand, 793 N.E.2d at 363–64. 
13 See id. at 363. 
14 Equally remarkable to the holding in Durand is the SJC’s decision in Zuckerman v. 
Town of Hadley, 813 N.E.2d 843 (Mass. 2004). In Zuckerman, the SJC struck down a regula-
tion limiting the number of lots within a subdivision that could be built upon within any 
12-month period, concluding that the bylaw did not serve a permissible public purpose. Id. 
at 851. The SJC reprimanded the town for its failure to link the growth management regu-
lation to studies or planning for future growth, but ignored the fact that no legal frame-
work for developing such studies exists in the state. Id. at 848–49. Additionally, it ignored 
an earlier Appeals Court ruling that “[n]either the master plan itself nor the law requires 
that zoning be in strict accordance with a master plan.” See Rando v. Town of N. Attlebor-
ough, 692 N.E.2d 544, 550 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998). 
15 See Daniel J. Curtin, Jr., Ramapo’s Impact on the Comprehensive Plan, 35 Urb. Law. 135, 
147 (2003). 
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quires an amendment to the comprehensive plan as a condition 
precedent to the adoption of the new and beneªcial zoning.16 Thus, 
while the results of bargaining in plan versus non-plan states may be 
the same—the zoning is changed—the process is very different.17 In a 
non-plan state, the municipality has sold—bargained—some aspect of 
its land use controls in exchange for some promise.18 This transaction 
is completed outside of a plan and has no relationship to a plan.19 In 
a plan state, however, while the end result may be identical, the proc-
ess ensures that the bargaining is in accordance and consistent with a 
plan or planning analysis.20
 The result of the bargaining, whether in non-plan states or in plan 
states, is derivative of the public giving, which in many ways deªnes 
land use planning—or lack of it—in the United States. Rather than 
plan for the derivative uses or demands that would logically follow a 
public project—for example, gasoline service stations at exits off a state 
highway system—these needs develop independently and haphazardly 
following the completion of the project. This predictable outcome, 
however, need not follow large-scale projects such as the Big Dig; the 
result can be avoided by careful attention to, and respect for, the integ-
rity of planning and zoning, and the rejection of the sale or bargaining 
away of land use control, which is an insidious form of givings. 
 As discussed below, while bargaining may be a basic human behav-
ioral characteristic carried forward from the days of bartering and ex-
change in the public marketplace, bargaining without a plan against 
which the legitimacy of the bargain can be measured will lead to cha-
otic development. 21  This simple requirement—having a plan which 
guides growth, against which decisions regarding land use can be 
evaluated—is what separates plan states from non-plan states.22 Plan 
states impose the guidance requirement; non-plan states do not.23
                                                                                                                      
16 Jonathan Douglas Witten, Carrying Capacity and the Comprehensive Plan: Establishing 
and Defending Limits to Growth, 28 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 583, 592 (2001). 
17 See id. at 594–99. 
18 See Durand, 793 N.E.2d at 363–64, 369; McLean Hosp. Corp. v. Town of Belmont, 
778 N.E.2d 1016, 1022–23 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002). 
19 The Massachusetts statute calling for a master plan does not require zoning to be 
subsequently in accordance with the plan, but rather merely that town ofªcials, prior to 
making a decision, take land use into consideration. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 41, § 81D 
(2002). 
20 See Curtin, supra note 15, at 147; see also Witten, supra note 16, at 594–99. 
21 See Edward J. Sullivan & Matthew J. Michel, Ramapo Plus Thirty: The Changing Role of 
the Plan in Land Use Regulation, 35 Urb. Law. 75, 82 (2003). 
22 See id. at 76. 
23 See id. 
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 We discuss below the clear distinction between plan and non-plan 
states using two extreme examples. In California, a true plan state, the 
courts have consistently ruled that land use ordinances, entitlements, 
requests, approvals, or the like, when inconsistent with the plan, are 
void ab initio.24 In Massachusetts, a non-plan state, the courts have 
regularly ruled that ordinances need not be in accordance with a plan 
and that, as a legal or practical matter, a plan has no meaning.25
 The problem encountered in non-plan states such as Massachu-
setts, as discussed below, is the absence of any predictive tool to de-
termine the future of land use decisions.26 Thus, particularly in the 
wake of large-scale projects as noted above, not only are subsidiary 
pressures to rezone for more ªnancially attractive uses inevitable, but 
the results are also unpredictable. Whereas plan states provide for 
logical and predictable bargaining because the bargaining will be 
consistent with the plan,27 non-plan states simply allow the bargaining 
in a manner that effectively resembles the unchecked mercantile 
market places of centuries past.28
 There are, of course, a whole host of problems with the latter. 
First, as the bargaining is not tied to a plan, there are few bargains 
that will fail to pass court scrutiny.29 Second, precisely because of the 
ªrst problem, the neighborhood abutting the bargained-for land use 
has little, if any, opportunity to rationally contest the bargaining:since 
the bartering need not be consistent with a plan, anything goes.30 
Third, unlike produce for sale at a weekend farmer’s market, the po-
lice powers are not a fungible product.31 While a bushel of apples can 
readily be exchanged for a ªve-dollar bill, is it possible to quantify the 
price that should be paid for the requested rezoning? 
                                                                                                                      
24 See, e.g., Lesher Communications, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 802 P.2d 317, 322 
(Cal. 1990). 
25 See, e.g., Rando v. Town of N. Attleborough, 692 N.E.2d 544, 550 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1998). 
26 See id. 
27 See Curtin, supra note 15, at 147. 
28 See Sullivan & Michel, supra note 21, at 82. 
29 See Durand v. IDC Bellingham, LLC, 793 N.E.2d 359, 363–64, 369 (Mass. 2003); 
McLean Hosp. Corp. v. Town of Belmont, 778 N.E.2d 1016, 1022–23 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002). 
30 See Durand, 793 N.E.2d at 363–64, 369; McLean Hosp., 778 N.E.2d at 1022–23. 
31 “But the power of governing is a trust committed by the people to the government, 
no part of which can be granted away.” Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 820 (1879). 
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 A pragmatic response to this question is found in “development 
agreements,” which are contractual tools found in plan states.32 A de-
velopment agreement recognizes that the marketplace—especially in 
the land use context—is forever pressuring for change. However, de-
velopment agreements also recognize that the bargaining must be 
consistent and in accordance with a rationally developed plan to avoid 
the uncertain and chaotic outcome of bargaining in its absence.33
I. Plan States Contrasted with Non-Plan States 
 In dealing with the derivative beneªt issue of future but deªnite 
public projects, such as Boston’s Big Dig, plan states’ zoning authori-
ties’ bargaining to achieve the appropriate land use controls would be 
guided by their general plans, especially in those states where the 
general plan is considered a constitution for all future development.34
 The importance of the [comprehensive plan35 or] General 
Plan sprang from the model legislation for planning and zon-
ing promulgated in 1926 and 1928 by the U.S. Department of 
Commerce under the leadership of the Secretary of Com-
merce Herbert Hoover. The [model] statutes were labeled the 
Standard State Zoning Enabling Act—1926 (SZEA) and the 
Standard Planning Enabling Act—1928 (SPEA). Section 3 of 
SZEA stated that zoning and other regulations be “in accor-
dance with a General Plan.”36
                                                                                                                      
32 David L. Callies et al., Bargaining for Development: A Handbook on Develop-
ment Agreements, Annexation Agreements, Land Development Conditions, Vested 
Rights and the Provision of Public Facilities 91 (2003). 
33 See id. at 103–04. 
34 See id. 
35 The term “comprehensive plan” is commonly called the “general plan” or “master 
plan.” The term “general plan” is being more commonly used today. Curtin, supra note 15, 
at 136 n.3. 
36 Curtin, supra note 15, at 135; see also A Standard State Zoning Enabling Act 
(Rev. ed. 1926), available at http://www.planning.org/growingsmart/pdf/SZEnablingAct 
1926.pdf; A Standard City Planning Enabling Act (1928), available at http://www. 
planning.org/growingsmart/pdf/CPEnablingAct1928.pdf. The revised 1926 SZEA emerged 
the same year that the Supreme Court delivered its decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty 
Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). See generally Jay Wickersham, Jane Jacobs’s Critique of Zoning: From 
Euclid to Portland and Beyond, 28 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 547, 553 (2001). 
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A. Use of the Plan in the United States 
 Regulation of land use in the United States occurs almost exclu-
sively at the local level. Consequently, regulations and procedures vary 
widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, with varying degrees of suc-
cess. From a national perspective, it is highly unlikely that Congress 
will undertake either land use regulation or an effort to standardize 
land use processes across the country. Consequently, reforms to deal 
with common problems likely will continue to develop at the local 
level. 
 Increasingly, local jurisdictions are implementing the comprehen-
sive plan as part of their land use planning process. Although speciªcs 
vary widely, most jurisdictions with a comprehensive plan view it as the 
“constitution” for development within that community. Typically, all 
subsequent land use decisions must be “consistent” with the vision for 
growth and development reºected in the comprehensive plan.37
B. The California Model 
 In California, land use regulations and approvals made by a city or 
county must, in most instances, be consistent with the city or county’s 
general plan.38 The general plan has been declared by the California 
Supreme Court as the single most important document and the “con-
stitution for all future development.”39 Since the general plan has such 
primacy, any decision of a city or county affecting land use, develop-
ment, or public works projects must be consistent with its general 
plan.40 Under California Government Code section 65,860(a), for ex-
ample, a zoning ordinance is consistent with a general plan only if: 
(1) the city or county has ofªcially adopted such a plan; and (2) the 
various land uses authorized by the zoning ordinance are compatible 
with the objectives, policies, general land uses, and programs speciªed 
in the plan.41
 In City of Irvine v. Irvine Citizens Against Overdevelopment, a Califor-
nia court of appeal held that a land use regulation is consistent with a 
city’s general plan where, considering all of its aspects, the ordinance 
                                                                                                                      
37 Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer & Thomas E. Roberts, Land Use Planning and 
Control Law 33–39 (2d ed. 2002). See generally Joseph DiMento, The Consistency 
Doctrine and the Limits of Planning (1980). 
38 Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 65,860(a), 65,867.5(c) (West 1997). 
39 Lesher Communications, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 802 P.2d 317, 321 (Cal. 1990). 
40 See Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Bd. of Supervisors, 801 P.2d 1161 (Cal. 1990). 
41 Cal. Gov’t Code § 65,860. 
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furthers the objectives and policies of the general plan and does not 
obstruct their attainment.42 A city’s ªnding that a land use regulation 
is consistent with its general plan can be reversed only if it is based on 
evidence from which no reasonable person could have reached the 
same conclusion.43
 The California courts have stated that a land use regulation incon-
sistent with a general plan at the time of enactment is “invalid[] ab ini-
tio,” meaning it was void when passed.44 If a land use regulation be-
comes inconsistent with a general plan by reason of an amendment to 
the plan, or to any element of the plan, the regulation must be 
amended within a reasonable time so that it is consistent with the 
amended general plan.45 Since general plan consistency is required, 
the absence of a valid general plan, or the failure of any relevant ele-
ments thereof to meet statutory criteria, “precludes the enactment of 
zoning ordinances and the like.”46
 To ensure that a Machiavellian community cannot avoid the 
planning requirements embodied in the statute by repeatedly and 
routinely amending its plan to achieve its zoning objectives, the legis-
lation limits the number of times mandatory elements of the plan 
may be amended per year to four.47
C. Other States 
 Nearly all states, in following the Standard Zone Enabling Act, 
require that zoning take place “in accordance with” some sort of 
comprehensive or master plan.48 States vary, however, in the degree to 
which the comprehensive plan is made a signiªcant or decisive factor 
in evaluating land use regulations, although over time there has been 
a slow and incremental trend nationwide toward it having quasi-
                                                                                                                      
42 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 797, 803 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). 
43 A Local & Reg’l Monitor v. City of Los Angeles, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 228, 239 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1993). 
44 Bldg. Indus. Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Oceanside, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 137, 146 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1994); see also Lesher Communications, 802 P.2d at 322; City of Irvine, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 803; 
deBottari v. Norco City Council, 217 Cal. Rptr. 790, 794 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). 
45 Cal. Gov’t Code § 65,860(c) (setting forth the rule for zoning ordinances). 
46 Res. Def. Fund v. County of Santa Cruz, 184 Cal. Rptr. 371, 373 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982). 
47 Cal. Gov’t Code § 65,358(b). In addition, plan amendments are subject to de-
tailed review pursuant to the California Environmental Quality Act and public hearings 
before the local planning commission and local legislative body. See Cal. Gov’t Code 
§ 65,350; Cal. Pub. Res. Code §§ 21,000–21,177; see also Daniel J. Curtin, Jr., Califor-
nia Land Use and Planning Law 29 (24th ed. 2004). 
48 Callies et al., supra note 32, at 41. 
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constitutional status.49 As categorized by one of the nation’s foremost 
commentators on the subject of the comprehensive plan, the states 
currently fall into three major classiªcations with respect to the role 
of the comprehensive plan in the land use regulatory process.50
 The ªrst category, the “unitary view” states, represents probably a 
majority of the states.51 In this category, the comprehensive plan is 
accorded no special signiªcance, meaning there is no requirement 
that local governments prepare a plan that is separate from zoning 
regulations.52 Examples of states falling into this category and having 
recent judicial decisions upholding the “unitary view” are Arkansas,53 
Connecticut,54 Illinois,55 New York,56 and, as discussed below, Massa-
chusetts. 
 States in the second category, termed the “planning factor” 
states, give some signiªcance to the comprehensive plan, if one exists, 
as a factor in evaluating land use regulations, but do not make it the 
exclusive factor.57 The weight to be given the plan varies from state to 
state. Examples of states in this category are Missouri,58 Montana,59 
and New Jersey.60
 The third category of states, called “plan as the constitution or 
the law” states, are those which, like California, grant the general plan 
quasi-constitutional status in regulating ordinances and other actions 
                                                                                                                      
49 Id. 
50 See Edward J. Sullivan, Comprehensive Planning, 36 Urb. Law. 541, 541 (2004); Curtin, 
supra note 15, at 137. See generally Sullivan & Michel, supra note 21 (tracing developments 
in the role of the comprehensive plan since a 1975 article was published). 
51 See Sullivan, supra note 50, at 541. 
52 See id. 
53 Rolling Pines Ltd. P’ship v. City of Little Rock, 40 S.W.3d 828, 833–34 (Ark. Ct. App. 
2001). 
54 Heithaus v. Planning & Zoning Comm’n, 779 A.2d 750, 759 (Conn. 2001). 
55 City of Chi. Heights v. Living Word Outreach Full Gospel Church & Ministries, Inc., 
749 N.E.2d 916, 920 (Ill. 2001) (failing to list accordance with the comprehensive plan as a 
criterion for special uses). 
56 Yellow Lantern Kampground v. Town of Cortlandville, 716 N.Y.S.2d 786, 789 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2000). 
57 See Sullivan, supra note 50, at 541. 
58 Fairview Enters., Inc. v. City of Kansas City, 62 S.W.3d 71, 82 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001). 
59 Greater Yellowstone Coalition, Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 25 P.3d 168, 171 
(Mont. 2001). 
60 Med. Ctr. at Princeton v. Township of Princeton Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 778 A.2d 
482, 502–03 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). 
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of the local government in implementing the plan. 61  Other states 
within this category include Florida,62 Oregon,63 and Washington.64
 Clear-cut policies and goals in a city’s or county’s general plan, 
which guide all developments and approval of development agree-
ments, would assure that any bargaining for land use entitlements ad-
heres to the public goals and policies in the adopted general plan, 
thus preventing piecemeal, ad hoc, or arbitrary and capricious deci-
sions.65
 In California and other plan states, “the general plan is the most 
important legal planning tool” for city and county ofªcials to utilize in 
their efforts to regulate development.66 It is unequivocally the “consti-
tution for all future development.”67 The goals and policies of the 
general plan can be used not only in managing growth, regulating 
development, and imposing land use regulations, but also in impos-
ing dedications and impact fees on new projects, rezoning, and other 
approvals, especially those not directly authorized under state law.68 
Examples in California “include dedications for libraries, police sta-
tions, and ªre station sites, and fees for affordable housing or child 
day care centers, provided there is a legally established nexus.”69
 In states such as California, Florida, Oregon, and Washington, for 
example, since the general plan is the controlling document, it pro-
vides protection against “knee-jerk,” Gallup poll-like land rezonings, 
insures appropriate due process, and leads to better-conceived plan-
ning to achieve the goals and policies of the municipality.70 There-
fore, when derivative beneªts are being considered, they must be 
weighed against the goals and policies of the plan as a whole. 
                                                                                                                      
61 See Sullivan, supra note 50, at 541. 
62 Buck Lake Alliance, Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 765 So.2d 124, 127 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2000). 
63 Jackson County Citizens’ League v. Jackson County, 15 P.3d 42, 48–49 (Or. Ct. App. 
2000). 
64 Ahmann-Yamane, LLC v. Tabler, 19 P.3d 436, 441 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). 
65 See A Standard State Zoning Enabling Act § 3 n.22 (Rev. ed. 1926), available at 
http://www.planning.org/growingsmart/pdf/SZEnablingAct1926.pdf. 
66 Curtin, supra note 15, at 149. 
67 Lesher Communications, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 802 P.2d 317, 321 (Cal. 1990). 
68 Curtin, supra note 15, at 149. 
69 Id. 
70 See Udell v. Haas, 235 N.E.2d 897, 900–01 (N.Y. 1968). 
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D. The Massachusetts “Model” 
 Unlike each of the states discussed above and a great many oth-
ers, Massachusetts does not require or even encourage cities and 
towns to plan.71 The very notion of “planning in Massachusetts” is an 
oxymoron.72 The courts have responded to challenges to rezonings or 
the issuance of adjudicative permits that argue “inconsistency with a 
plan” by summarily ruling that a master plan has no legal meaning in 
Massachusetts.73
 The American Planning Association has criticized the Massachu-
setts Zoning Act as contradictory, too “confusing,” and “outdated,”74 
while the Massachusetts Appeals Court has characterized the vested 
rights portion of the Act as “infelicitous.”75 The results of such an 
“anti-planning” platform are far-reaching. The Massachusetts courts 
have held that cities and towns: 
• are free to engage in rezoning of property conditioned upon the 
payment of money—lots of money;76 
                                                                                                                      
71 See generally Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40A (2002) (failing to mention a comprehensive 
plan). 
72 Two notable exceptions exist. The Martha’s Vineyard Commission Act, 1974 Mass. 
Acts 637, and the Cape Cod Commission Act, 1989 Mass. Acts 716, provide for planning 
consistency among the Vineyard’s six towns and Cape Cod’s 15 municipalities. Section 
9(d) of the Cape Cod Commission Act provides that if a town prepares a plan consistent 
with the regional plan prepared by the Cape Cod Commission, the town may elect to im-
pose impact fees and enter into development agreements. Towns wishing to execute de-
velopment agreements must then adopt the terms and conditions of the Commission’s 
Model Development Agreement Bylaw. See Cape Cod Comm’n, An Introduction to the Cape 
Cod Commission Model Bylaws and Regulations Project (Nov. 5, 2002) (drafted for the Commis-
sion by Jonathan Douglas Witten in 1997), http://www.capecodcommission.org/bylaws. 
73 “Neither the master plan itself nor the law requires that zoning be in strict accor-
dance with a master plan.” Rando v. Town of N. Attleborough, 692 N.E.2d 544, 550 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 1998). Section 81D of chapter 41 of the Massachusetts General Laws requires 
planning boards to “make a master plan,” but provides no requirement that regulations 
adopted by the city or town be consistent with the plan. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 41, § 81D. 
The plan is adopted by a majority of the members of the planning board, not the local 
legislative body. See id. The verb “planning” does not appear once in the entirety of the 
Massachusetts Zoning Act or the Subdivision Control Law. See id. ch. 40A; id. ch. 41, § 81L. 
74 See Am. Planning Ass’n, Planning for Smart Growth: 2002 State of the States 
71 (Feb. 2002), available at http://www.planning.org/growingsmart/pdf/states2002.pdf. 
75 Fitzsimonds v. Bd. of Appeals, 484 N.E.2d 113, 115 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985); see also 
Joel S. Russell, Massachusetts Land-Use Laws—Time for a Change, Land Use L. & Zoning 
Dig., Jan. 2002, at 3; Jon Witten, Affordable Housing—At What Price?, Land Use L. & Zoning 
Dig., Jan. 2002, at 6, 6, 8 (labeling the Massachusetts land use system as “dysfunctional,” 
“Byzantine,” and “promoting anarchy”). 
76 Durand v. IDC Bellingham, LLC, 793 N.E.2d 359, 369 (Mass. 2003). 
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• are free to engage in rezoning of property conditioned upon 
completion of speciªc public improvements;77 
• are not bound by the goals or policies of a locally adopted plan— 
if one exists—in their legislative or adjudicative decisionmak-
ing;78 and 
• cannot impose long-term growth management devices, regardless 
of whether they have a planning basis.79 
II. Bargaining Away the Police Power: What Goes Wrong in 
Non-Plan States 
 Without a plan to guide or control land use decisionmaking, land 
use regulations—zoning, subdivision control, health, and design 
guidelines—are for sale.80 Since there is no basis upon which zoning 
decisions are made, almost any decision will be perceived by a review-
ing court as rational.81
 This is unfortunate, and ironic, as the rational basis standard is 
applied by the courts in land use matters to ensure broad deference 
to the actions of city or county legislative bodies.82 A reviewing court 
will not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature, and the leg-
islature is granted an enviable presumption of validity.83 This broad 
grant of power, without a simultaneous legislative requirement that 
regulations be in accordance with a plan, leaves cities and towns free 
to zone as they please, and just as free to bargain that power away.84
 Two recent Massachusetts state court holdings highlight the risk 
of allowing cities and towns to bargain away their regulatory tools 
without adherence to a plan.85 In Durand v. IDC Bellingham, LLC, a 
decision remarkable for the court’s willingness to sanction an overt 
                                                                                                                      
77 McLean Hosp. Corp. v. Town of Belmont, 778 N.E.2d 1016, 1023 (Mass. App. Ct. 
2002). 
78 Rando, 692 N.E.2d at 550. 
79 Zuckerman v. Town of Hadley, 813 N.E.2d 843, 849 (Mass. 2004). 
80 See, e.g., Durand, 793 N.E.2d at 363–64, 369; McLean Hosp., 778 N.E.2d at 1023. 
81 The Massachusetts statute calling for a master plan does not require zoning to be 
subsequently in accordance with the plan, but rather merely that town ofªcials, prior to 
making a decision, take land use into consideration. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 41, § 81D 
(2002). 
82 See, e.g., McLean Hosp., 778 N.E.2d at 1022 (holding that if a zoning action is not ar-
bitrary, local judgment on the subject should be sustained). 
83 See id. 
84 See, e.g., Durand, 793 N.E.2d at 369; McLean Hosp., 778 N.E.2d at 1023; Rando v. 
Town of N. Attleborough, 692 N.E.2d 544, 550 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998). 
85 See Durand, 793 N.E.2d at 369; McLean Hosp., 778 N.E.2d at 1023. 
338 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 32:325 
trade of zoning for cash, the SJC upheld a rezoning that was directly 
and indisputably linked to the payment of an $8 million gift.86 The 
court upheld the payment-for-rezoning scheme, citing the rational 
basis test: “In general, there is no reason to invalidate a legislative act 
on the basis of an ‘extraneous consideration,’ because we defer to leg-
islative ªndings and choices without regard to motive. We see no rea-
son to make an exception for legislative acts that are in the nature of 
zoning enactments . . . .”87 Only the dissenting justices seemed con-
cerned about issues of enforceability—what happens if the beneªciary 
of the rezoning breaches?—and the public policy issues raised where 
“needy” cities and towns see their zoning powers as for sale to the 
highest bidder.88
 In McLean Hospital Corp. v. Town of Belmont, the Appeals Court 
upheld a rezoning linked to a land owner’s conveyances of surplus 
parcels to the town and to off-site improvements to be made by the 
land owner. The court concluded that if the zoning action by itself is a 
valid exercise of the police powers, such validity is not negated by bar-
gaining, provided that the bargaining is related to the property sub-
ject to the rezoning.89
 In both cases, then, the courts conclude that a promise by a peti-
tioner is different from a requirement imposed as a condition precedent 
by the municipality.90 The courts also appear to conclude that if the 
rezoning would have been permissible without the promise, then the 
promise did not induce or inºuence the legislative action.91 Finally, 
while the Appeals Court appears to require some nexus between the 
rezoning and the proffered—or extracted—promise, the SJC appears 
to conclude that the rational basis test allows cities and towns to bar-
                                                                                                                      
86 793 N.E.2d at 368–69. 
87 Id. at 369. Three justices ªled an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, 
ªnding that it was a bare “sale of the police power because there is nothing in the record 
to legitimize the $8 million offer as ‘intended to mitigate the impact of the development 
upon the town’ . . . .” Id. at 371 (Spina, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(quoting Rando, 692 N.E.2d at 548). They suggest, however, that if the $8 million offer had 
been directly linked to the impacts caused by the proposed power plant, as opposed to a 
cash gift of $8 million unconnected to any speciªc impact, the agreement to rezone in 
exchange for payment would not have been inappropriate. Id. (Spina, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
88 Id. at 371. “Sadly, these circumstances demonstrate government and private interests 
at their shameful worst, and are most likely to involve the most needy towns.” Id. 
89 McLean Hosp., 778 N.E.2d at 1021 (ªnding that legitimacy of zoning actions is not 
lessened by “ancillary agreements not involving consideration extraneous to the property 
being rezoned”). 
90 See Durand, 793 N.E.2d at 369; McLean Hosp., 778 N.E.2d at 1023. 
91 See Durand, 793 N.E.2d at 369; McLean Hosp., 778 N.E.2d at 1023. 
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gain freely whether or not the offer or extraction is related to the re-
zoning.92 Both courts send a similar, clear message.93
 Of concern is that the courts are approving the end result rather 
than focusing on the process of bargaining or the risks associated with 
it. If the end result is permissible—almost always so when the rational 
basis standard is applied—the process of getting there is secondary.94
 As discussed in Part III, plan states have adopted a means of pro-
viding for the same ºexibility witnessed in cases like Durand and 
McLean Hospital, but commensurate with the due process protections 
so clearly lacking in those cases.95 It is the development agreement 
that has successfully bridged the gap between unfettered bargaining 
and rigid, inºexible zoning. 96  We believe that development agree-
ments are a valuable and vital tool for overcoming the dangers associ-
ated with the former and the problems inherent in the latter. 
III. Development Agreements—Controls and Opportunities in 
the Bargaining Process 
 Many states have authorized the use of development agreements 
mainly for the purpose of giving developers some assurance that a 
project can be completed once all land use and discretionary approv-
                                                                                                                      
92 See Durand, 793 N.E.2d at 369; McLean Hosp., 778 N.E.2d at 1023. 
93 See Durand, 793 N.E.2d at 369; McLean Hosp., 778 N.E.2d at 1023. 
94 Massachusetts leads the nation in “ends versus means” legislation regarding the de-
velopment of affordable housing as well. Rather than adopt a plan or policy for the crea-
tion of below market rate dwelling units, Massachusetts holds onto a 35-year-old statute 
that permits the avoidance of all locally adopted regulations where a developer sells or 
rents 25% of the new dwellings below market rates. The remaining 75% of the dwellings 
are constructed without adherence to local regulations and unencumbered by density, 
height, bulk or otherwise traditional zoning controls. The statute has, not surprisingly, 
resulted in the construction of over 30,000 new dwelling units. But the due process costs 
are extensive. See generally Jonathan Douglas Witten, The Cost of Developing Affordable Hous-
ing: At What Price?, 30 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 509 (2003); Christopher Baker, Note, Hous-
ing in Crisis: A Call to Reform Massachusetts’s Affordable Housing Law, 32 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. 
Rev. 165 (2005). 
95 See Witten, supra note 94, at 516–20. 
96 See, e.g., Callies et al., supra note 32; Inst. for Local Self Gov’t, Development 
Agreement Manual: Collaboration in Pursuit of Community Interest (2002); Dan-
iel J. Curtin, Jr., Effectively Using Development Agreements to Protect Land Use Entitlements: Les-
sons from California, 25 Zoning & Plan. L. Rep. 33 (2002) [hereinafter Curtin, Effectively 
Using Development Agreements]; Daniel J. Curtin, Jr., Exactions, Dedications and Development 
Agreements Nationally and in California: When and How Do the Dolan/Nollan Rules Apply?, in 
Inst. for Local Gov’t Studies, Ctr. for Am. & Int’l Law, Proceedings of the Insti-
tute on Planning, Zoning, and Eminent Domain (33d ed. 2003); Brad K. Schwartz, 
Note, Development Agreements: Contracting for Vested Rights, 28 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 719 
(2001). 
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als have been obtained.97 However, as development agreements have 
come into more frequent use, an increasing number of local govern-
ment units have begun using them to obtain beneªts for the public 
which ordinarily could not be obtained using the normal land use 
process.98 So far, thirteen states have adopted legislation enabling lo-
cal governments to enter into development agreements with property 
owners or developers.99 In addition, some states, such as Texas, allow 
the use of development agreements in the absence of any such state 
legislation.100
A. Development Agreements—The California Statute 
 In 1979, the California Legislature enacted a statute establishing 
a property development agreement procedure.101 The principal pro-
visions of the legislation governing development agreements are as 
follows: 
• Cities and counties are given express authorization to enter into 
a development agreement and may adopt procedures to do so by 
resolution or ordinance.102 
• The development agreement is enforceable by any party to the 
agreement, notwithstanding a change in any applicable general 
or speciªc plan, zoning, subdivision, or building regulation 
adopted by the city.103 
                                                                                                                      
97 See Inst. for Local Self Gov’t, supra note 96, at 19–21. 
98 See id. at 14. 
99 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9-500.05 (West 1996 & Supp. 2000); Cal. Gov’t Code 
§ 65,864 (West 1997); Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 24-68-101 to -106 (2000); Fla. Stat. Ann. 
§ 163.3220 (West 2000); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 46-123 (1993); Idaho Code § 67-6511A (Mi-
chie 1995 & Supp. 2000); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33:4780.22 (West 1988 & Supp. 2000); 
Nev. Rev. Stat. 278.0201 (1997); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40:55D-45.2 (West 1991); Or. Rev. 
Stat. § 94.504 (1999) (enacted into law in 1993 by the Legislative Assembly but not made 
a part of the Oregon Revised Statutes until much later); S.C. Code Ann. § 6-31-10 (Law. 
Co-op. Supp. 2000); Va. Code Ann. § 15.2-2303.1 (Michie 1997) (applies only to counties 
with a population between 10,300 and 11,000 and developments consisting of more than 
1000 acres); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 36.70B.170 (West 1991 & Supp. 2000). 
100 See R. Alan Haywood & David Hartman, Legal Basics for Development Agreements, 32 
Tex. Tech L. Rev. 955, 957–58 (2001). 
101 Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 65,864–65,869.5. 
102 Id. § 65,865. 
103 Id. § 65,865.4; see also City of W. Hollywood v. Beverly Towers, Inc., 805 P.2d 329, 
334 n.6 (Cal. 1991); 76 Op. Att’y Gen. Cal. 227 (1993). 
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• Unless otherwise provided by the development agreement, the 
applicable rules, regulations, and policies are those that are in 
force at the time of the execution of the agreement.104 
• A city’s or county’s exercise of its power to enter into a develop-
ment agreement is a legislative act. It must be approved by ordi-
nance; it must be consistent with the general plan and any 
speciªc plan; and is subject to repeal by referendum.105 
• There is a ninety-day statute of limitations to challenge the adop-
tion or amendment of a development agreement approved on or 
after January 1, 1996.106 
• A city or county may terminate or modify a development agree-
ment if it ªnds, on the basis of substantial evidence, that the ap-
plicant or successor in interest thereto has not complied in good 
faith with its terms or conditions.107 
B. Contracting Away the Police Power 
 Not infrequently, those who challenge projects governed by de-
velopment agreements will argue that such agreements are invalid 
because the local governmental unit is “contracting away” its police 
power.108 The courts have not been persuaded by this argument.109
 For example, in Santa Margarita Area Residents Together v. San Luis 
Obispo County Board of Supervisors, an area residents’ association con-
tended that because San Luis Obispo County had entered into a de-
velopment agreement freezing zoning for a project for a ªve-year pe-
riod before the project was ready for construction, the county 
improperly contracted away its zoning authority.110 In holding for the 
county, the court noted that “land use regulation is an established 
function of local government,” thereby providing the authority for a 
locality to enter into contracts to carry out that function. 111  The 
county’s development agreement required that the project be devel-
                                                                                                                      
104 Cal. Gov’t Code § 65,866. 
105 Id. § 65,867.5; see also Native Sun/Lyon Cmtys. v. City of Escondido, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
344, 354 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); Midway Orchards v. County of Butte, 269 Cal. Rptr. 796, 800 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1990). 
106 Cal. Gov’t Code § 65,009(c)(4). 
107 Id. § 65,865.1. 
108 See Santa Margarita Area Residents Together v. San Luis Obispo County Bd. of Su-
pervisors, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 740, 747–48 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 748. 
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oped in accordance with the county’s general plan; did not permit 
construction until the county had approved detailed building plans; 
retained the county’s discretionary authority in the future; and al-
lowed a zoning freeze of limited duration only.112 The court found 
that the zoning freeze in the county’s development agreement was 
not a surrender of the police power but instead “advance[d] the pub-
lic interest by preserving future options.”113
 In another case, Stephens v. City of Vista, the plaintiffs purchased 
property to develop an apartment complex of approximately 140 to 
150 units.114 Several years later, the City of Vista lowered the elevation 
of the access street to the property, frustrating the owners’ contem-
plated use; the City subsequently also downzoned the property.115 The 
owners sued.116 The owners and the City eventually entered into a set-
tlement agreement providing for approval of a speciªc plan and zon-
ing that permitted construction of a maximum of 140 units.117 After 
rezoning the property, the City denied a site development plan, in 
part because it wanted the owners to reduce the density.118 The own-
ers then renewed their lawsuit against the City.119
 The City argued that the settlement agreement unlawfully con-
tracted away its police power.120 The court disagreed.121 It ªrst noted 
that when the City entered into the settlement agreement, it under-
stood that it was obligated to approve 140 units.122 Further, relying on 
Morrison Homes Corp. v. City of Pleasanton,123 the court held that while 
generally a city cannot contract away its legislative and governmental 
functions, this rule applies only to void a contract that amounts to a 
city’s “surrender” of its control of a municipal function.124 Simply con-
tracting for a guaranteed density and exercising its discretion in the 
site development process did not constitute surrendering control of 
all of its land use authority.125
                                                                                                                      
112 Id. at 748–49. 
113 Id. 
114 994 F.2d 650, 652 (9th Cir. 1993). 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 653. 
119 Id. 
120 Stephens, 994 F.2d at 654. 
121 Id. at 655. 
122 Id. at 657. 
123 130 Cal. Rptr. 196, 202 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976). 
124 Stephens, 994 F.2d at 655. 
125 Id. at 656. 
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 In City of Glendale v. Superior Court, the court held that in entering 
into a ªxed-term lease as a lessor, a city had not contracted away its 
eminent domain power to condemn the lessee’s leasehold interest 
and take back the property.126 Unlike Stephens, where the City agreed 
to approval of 140 units as part of a settlement,127 in City of Glendale 
the issue of possible condemnation was not raised in the contract nor 
in closing negotiations.128 Accordingly, the court did not ªnd an im-
plied waiver of the eminent domain power.129
C. Not Subject to the Nollan/Dolan Heightened Scrutiny Standard 
 In the landmark takings cases of Nollan v. California Coastal Com-
mission 130  and Dolan v. City of Tigard 131  the U.S. Supreme Court 
adopted a heightened scrutiny standard to determine the validity of 
local agency exactions. 132  However, since development agreements 
are adopted as a result of negotiations between the local agency and a 
developer, they are not subject to the Nollan/Dolan heightened scru-
tiny standard.133
 In Leroy Land Development v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, a fed-
eral appeals court held that a developer who voluntarily enters into an 
agreement with a public agency cannot subsequently challenge a 
mitigation obligation of the agreement as a taking.134 Here, the de-
veloper entered into a settlement agreement under which it agreed to 
certain restrictions on development.135 After the U.S. Supreme Court 
decided Nollan, the developer sought to challenge the restriction as a 
taking.136 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the 
challenge, holding that regardless of whether the restriction would 
have violated the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause if imposed as a 
                                                                                                                      
126 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 305, 313 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). 
127 Stephens, 994 F.2d at 652. 
128 See City of Glendale, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 311–12. 
129 Id. 
130 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
131 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
132 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 374; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837–38. 
133 See Leroy Land Dev. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 939 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 
1991). For further discussion on this issue, see David L. Callies & Julie A. Tappendorf, 
Unconstitutional Land Development Conditions and the Development Agreement Solution: Bargain-
ing for Public Facilities After Nollan and Dolan, 51 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 663 (2001). 
134 939 F.2d at 698. 
135 Id. at 697–98. 
136 Id. at 698. 
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condition of development, it could not be found invalid because the 
developer had voluntarily agreed to the condition: 
 The threshold issue is whether, assuming arguendo that the 
mitigation provisions would constitute a taking under Nollan if 
imposed unilaterally by TRPA [the Tahoe Regional Planning 
Agency], they can be viewed as a “taking” when consented to 
as a part of a settlement agreement. We hold that they cannot. 
The mitigation provisions at issue here were a negotiated 
condition of Leroy’s settlement agreement with TRPA in 
which beneªts and obligations were incurred by both parties. 
Such a contractual promise which operates to restrict a prop-
erty owner’s use of land cannot result in a “taking” because 
the promise is entered into voluntarily, in good faith and is 
supported by consideration. Indeed we have found only one 
case in which an agreement negotiated before Nollan was 
challenged as a “taking” after Nollan, and it reached the same 
conclusion we reach. To allow Leroy to challenge the settle-
ment agreement ªve years after its execution, based on a sub-
sequent change in the law, would inject needless uncertainty 
and an utter lack of ªnality to settlement agreements of this 
kind. We therefore hold that a takings analysis as articulated 
in Nollan is inapplicable where, as here, parties choose to ter-
minate or avoid litigation by executing a settlement agree-
ment supported by consideration.137
 There is a further problem with attempting to challenge a devel-
opment agreement fee, especially in California. Under a line of state 
cases starting with Pfeiffer v. City of La Mesa, acceptance and use of a 
land use approval waives any right to challenge the condition.138 In 
response, the California Legislature enacted the pay-under-protest 
statute, Government Code section 66,020, which allows a developer 
to protest and challenge a fee or condition without waiving the 
beneªt of the permit.139 However, this provision is part of the Mitiga-
tion Fee Act and applies only to development fees as deªned in sec-
tion 66,000.140 Because fees imposed under a development agreement 
                                                                                                                      
137 Id. at 698–99 (citations omitted). The court in Meredith v. Talbot County reached the 
same conclusion. 560 A.2d 599, 604–05 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989). 
138 See 137 Cal. Rptr. 804, 806 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977). 
139 Cal. Gov’t Code § 66,020 (West 1997). 
140 Id. §§ 66,000(b), 66,020. 
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are expressly excluded from that deªnition, they are not subject to 
the protection of section 66,020.141
 In light of Leroy Land, more cities and counties are interested in 
using development agreements to obtain exactions that might not be 
valid were the heightened Nollan/Dolan standard applicable, but that 
would be valid under Leroy Land, because voluntarily entered into by 
the developer. 
 In dealing with derivative beneªts and the resultant bargaining, 
when a local agency and a property owner or developer engage in a 
development agreement, they still must adhere to the goals and poli-
cies of the local agency’s general plan, at least in California, Hawaii, 
Idaho, and other states that require consistency of such agreements 
with the general plan.142 This is yet another factor that differentiates 
plan states from non-plan states such as Massachusetts. In a plan state, 
the bargaining is constrained and therefore predictable.143 In a non-
plan state, the only constraints are those imposed by the rational basis 
standard of review.144
IV. Using the Plan to Minimize Derivative Bargaining  
and to Ensure Due Process 
 The California Supreme Court’s characterization of the general 
plan as the “constitution”145 is instructive guidance for non-plan state 
legislatures. Without a constitution-like framework within which land 
use decisions are made, zoning becomes, as witnessed by the Massa-
chusetts cases described in Parts I.D and II, “nothing more than just a 
Gallup poll.”146
 With a general plan in place, the development agreement can be 
an effective and ºexible tool, beneªting public and private sectors 
alike. The plan’s guidance establishes what is and what is not within 
the ambit of permissible negotiation.147 As such, the plan ensures due 
                                                                                                                      
141 Id. § 66,000(b); see id. § 66,020. 
142 See Callies et al., supra note 32, at 103–04. 
143 See Callies et al., supra note 32, at 103; Inst. for Local Self Gov’t, supra note 
96, at 26. 
144 See Witten, supra note 94, at 514. 
145 Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Bd. of Supervisors, 801 P.2d 1161, 1171 (Cal. 1990). 
146 Udell v. Haas, 235 N.E.2d 897, 901 (N.Y. 1968); see Charles M. Haar, “In Accordance 
with a Comprehensive Plan,” 68 Harv. L. Rev. 1154, 1158 (1955) (expressing concern that 
unchecked zoning authority could “operate in an arbitrary and discriminatory fashion” 
rather than being directed properly “to the health, safety, welfare, and morals of the com-
munity”). 
147 See Inst. for Local Self Gov’t, supra note 96, at 26. 
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process; it necessitates predictable outcomes; and it puts the public on 
proper notice as to what those outcomes could be. Without the gen-
eral plan, the bargaining sky is, literally, unlimited. 
 Finally, much has been made of the term “smart growth” in re-
cent years.148 The American Planning Association’s Growing Smart pro-
ject produced a comprehensive treatise designed to assist states, cities, 
and towns in adopting meaningful planning legislation and planning 
tools to implement the plans.149 The project was a collaborative effort 
with an unassailable conclusion: smart growth—as well as the use of 
development agreements to assist in that growth—requires planning 
for growth.150 We argue that planning for growth requires the adop-
tion of general plans to set the framework for such planning. 
 Land use regulation and the bargaining of any element of that 
regulation in the absence of planning is inherently arbitrary.151 That 
courts in non-plan states have not yet reached this conclusion is be-
yond our understanding. We predict, however, that such a day is com-
ing. To avoid the unpleasant consequences accompanying a court’s 
conclusion that a municipality’s zoning regulation is void, we urge 
non-plan states to look across their borders to what plan states have 
accomplished and the protections these states have guaranteed to fu-
ture generations. 
                                                                                                                      
148 See Curtin, Effectively Using Development Agreements, supra note 96, at 33. See generally 
Am. Planning Ass’n, Growing Smart Legislative Guidebook: Model Statutes for 
Planning and the Management of Change (Stuart Meck ed., 2002). 
149 See generally Am. Planning Ass’n, supra note 148. 
150 See id. at A-9 (comments from Paul S. Barru, Directorate Member for the Built En-
vironment, stating that an assumption on which the treatise is based is that “Smart Growth 
means planning for growth”). 
151 See Witten, supra note 16, at 593. 
